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Indo-Pacific

Indian Perspectives:
Insights for the Indo-American Partnership
Tyrell O. Mayfield

ABSTRACT: To buttress stability in the Indo-Pacific, the United States must
understand how India sees the region and the world. The theories and ideas
of Kautilya, a leading but little-studied Indian philosopher, provide significant
insight into Indian perspectives on strategic partnerships and silent war.
India has lived out Kautilyan perspectives in its recent foreign policy;
therefore, a US understanding of the Indian perspective could advance the national
security interests of both countries, clarify recent Indian security responses
around the world, and provide a basis for the mutually beneficial pursuit of a free
and open Indo-Pacific.
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hina’s rapid and aggressive expansion has led India to increase its security
cooperation efforts with Australia, Japan, and the United States, a grouping
of likeminded states known as the Quad.1 One sign of the Quad’s growing
influence was the first in-person meeting of its four leaders in September 2021;
they met again in May 2022.2 The Quad is a powerful diplomatic tool for addressing
shared concerns in the Indo-Pacific, and the same grouping of states also has a history
of combined military exercises. The United States recognized the importance of
the Quad in the 2017 US National Security Strategy, and the 2021 Interim National

1. Stephen F. Burgess and Janet Beilstein, “Multilateral Defense Cooperation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region:
Tentative Steps toward a Regional NATO?,” Contemporary Security Policy 39, no. 2 (2018): 273; Oliver Stuenkel,
“India’s National Interests and Diplomatic Activism: Towards Global Leadership?,” LSE IDEAS, IDEAS Report
(London: London School of Economics and Political Science, May 2012), 36, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43446/1/India
_India%27s%20national%20interests%20and%20diplomatic%20activism%28lsero%29.pdf; and Mark Beeson and
Troy Lee-Brown, “The Future of Asian Regionalism: Not What It Used to Be?,” Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies 4,
no. 2 (2017): 198.
2. “Media Center: Joint Statement from Quad Leaders,” Ministry of External Affairs/Government
of India (website), September 24, 2021, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/34318/Joint_Statement
_from_Quad_Leaders; “Briefing Room: Joint Statement from Quad Leaders,” White House (website),
September 24, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/joint-statement
-from-quad-leaders/; “Media Center:Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement,” Ministry of External Affairs/Government
of India (website), May 24, 2022, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/35357/Quad_Joint_Leaders
_Statement; and “Briefing Room: Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement,” White House (website), May 24, 2022,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/24/quad-joint-leaders-statement/.

28 Parameters 52(4) Winter 2022–23

Security Strategic Guidance further reinforces the importance of strengthening the
US-Indian relationship.3
Stability in the Indo-Pacific will define American security interests
for the foreseeable future. An understanding of how India’s national
interests and regional perspectives inform its foreign policy points to the
confluence of Indo-American national security interests. This alignment
offers unique opportunities for both countries and sets the stage in favor
of Indo-American interests for decades to come. If the United States
is to secure a free and open Indo-Pacific, it must gain the complete
partnership of India. To do so, US leadership must understand how India
sees itself, the region, and its place in the world. A review of India’s strategic
partnership agreements with Afghanistan, its Maritime Security Strategy,
and the revitalization of the Quad can draw out contemporary examples
of Indian decision making and improve the United States’ understanding
of Indian foreign policy.4
The writings of Kautilya, a leading Indian philosopher, best explain
India’s pursuit of its national security interests. This Indian statesman
and political adviser emerged around 300 BCE and provided a realist
outlook on geopolitics through the Artha-shastra, his foundational work.5
The treatise outlined a classical vision of political wisdom and guided the
creation of the Mauryan Empire. Importantly, Kautilyan theory provides
a culturally and historically informed construct for assessing Indian
behavior. Kautilyan logic continues to influence Indian strategic thought
and is manifest in India’s national security interests and assessment
of regional and international relations.

3. Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America: December 2017
(Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 46, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp–content/uploads/2017/12
/NSS–Final–12–18–2017–0905.pdf; and Joseph R. Biden Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance:
March 2021 (Washington, DC: White House, 2021), 10, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp–content/uploads/2021/03
/NSC–1v2.pdf.
4. Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security
Strategy – 2015, October 2015, https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/indian-maritime-security-strategy-2015.
5. Kautilya, The Arthashastra, trans. L. N. Rangarajan (Haryana: Penguin Random House India, 1992);
Roger Boesche, The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and His Arthashastra (Lanham, MD: Lexington
Books, 2002), 8; and Roger Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India,”
Journal of Military History 67, no. 1 (2003): 16.
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Indian Interests and Perspectives
While India is not often recognized as a great power, there is a compelling
argument that it has arrived, and India certainly sees itself as a foundational
world civilization and a great power.6 In sheer mass, India is a cornerstone
of Asia, with 1.3 billion people, the world’s sixth-largest economy with a
gross domestic product of $2.66 trillion, and the world’s second-largest
army.7 Additionally, India is home to great schools of thought and an
enduring cultural legacy. A key player in South Asia, India possesses clear
extra-regional economic and security interests and the resources and will to
pursue them.8
Evaluating Indian national security interests is not as straightforward
as it is for Western powers. Unlike the United States, the United
Kingdom, or France, India has not published a national security strategy.
India’s regional approach and foreign policy, however, reflect its decision
to act like a great power in pursuing national security interests and reveal
the nature of these interests.9 The country’s economic expansion and
military aid to Afghanistan, paired with a convergence of strategic interests
with the United States, point to interests and influence that extend
beyond the region. 10 India is recognized within the international system
as a force to be considered.11
Through Indian Eyes: National Security Interests
Although India has long presented itself as a nonaligned state,
its emergence as a great power has driven it toward a more active role in the
international system. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s shift in Indian foreign
policy reveals three core national interests. The first is a desire to sustain the
international system, which helped give rise to Indian power and influence
and allows India to address internal economic and societal development

6. Trump, National Security Strategy, 46; and Manjeet S. Pardesi, “Is India a Great Power? Understanding
Great Power Status in Contemporary International Relations,” Asian Security 11, no. 1 (2015): 1, 23.
7. “GDP–India,” World Bank: Data (website), n.d., accessed October 22, 2021, https://data.worldbank.org
/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=IN; “India: Military and Security,” Central Intelligence Agency
World Factbook (website), updated September 1, 2022, accessed January 7, 2022, https://www.cia.gov/the
–world–factbook/countries/india/#military–and–security.
8. Pardesi, “Is India a Great Power?,” 1, 23.
9. Rory Medcalf, “Imagining an Indian National Security Strategy: The Sum of Its Parts,” Australian Journal
of International Affairs 71, no. 5 (2017): 517.
10. Vinay Kaura, “Grading India’s Neighborhood Diplomacy,” Diplomat (website), January 1, 2018,
https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/grading–indias–neighborhood–diplomacy/.
11. Pardesi, “Is India a Great Power?” 1, 23; and Trump, National Security Strategy, 46.
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through cultivating foreign investment, implementing infrastructure projects,
and securing the energy resources necessary for growth.12
A second national interest is to deter Pakistan without escalating
armed conflict between these two nuclear states beyond the conventional
threshold.13 This objective requires India to manage its relationships
with Pakistan and China, two actors whose fates are increasingly linked.
A decline in US-Pakistani relations, coupled with China’s One Belt One
Road and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor initiatives, have deepened
Sino-Pakistani relations.
A third national interest is maintaining Indian hegemony in its traditional
sphere of influence. Chinese encroachment into the Indian Ocean region
is a complex issue marred by a history of mutual mistrust.14 China’s outreach
to Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar improves Chinese access to ports
in the Indian Ocean and positions it to compete in India’s traditional
sphere of influence. India perceives China’s attempts to expand its foothold
in Southeast Asia as slow encirclement by an adversary and therefore
approaches the situation as a zero-sum game of influence and access,
which will either be won by China or by India.15
The Indian Neighborhood: Kautilya’s Mandala Assessment
India seeks to maintain hegemony in its traditional sphere of influence.
Kautilya described this area as emanating from the Indian subcontinent
west to Persia, north to Bactria (modern-day Afghanistan), and east
to Bengal. 16 Today this region is roughly composed of the eight member states
of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation: Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 17
India dominates this area, possessing over 80 percent of the association’s
landmass, population, and gross domestic product.18
Assessing India’s regional neighborhood through the lens of Kautilya’s
Mandala theory can help the United States understand Indian actions
and intentions. Kautilya’s tool for assessing geopolitics assumed bordering
12. Medcalf, “Indian National Security Strategy,” 520.
13. Medcalf, “Indian National Security Strategy,” 520.
14. Medcalf, “Indian National Security Strategy,” 520.
15. Kaura, “Grading India’s Neighborhood”; and Stephen Burgess, “The U.S. Pivot to Asia and Renewal
of the U.S.–India Strategic Partnership,” Comparative Strategy 34, no. 4 (2015): 369.
16. Kautilya, Arthashastra, xiv, 28, 507.
17. Breffni O’Rourke, “South Asia: Afghanistan Joins World’s Largest Regional Grouping,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (website), April 3, 2007, https://www.rferl.org/a/1075660.html.
18. Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty, “India’s Foreign Policy in the Neighbourhood,” Indian Foreign Affairs
Journal 9, no. 2 (2014): 144.
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kingdoms were inherently hostile and those nations immediately beyond,
or opposite a neighboring state, were potential allies.19 Although Kautilya
used this model to describe smaller, warring kingdoms and not modern
nation-states, the model offers insight into the current Indian perspective.20
Applying the Mandala theory clarifies Indian relationships in South
Asia through a country’s position relative to India. The model places
Pakistan and India at odds as bordering states and makes Afghanistan
a potential Indian ally. As other states within India’s traditional sphere of
influence, Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka are seen as potential
adversaries that may also be threatened by a shared enemy and bordering
state—China.21 At the strategic level, the Mandala theory adds China as a
potential adversary and Iran as a potential ally. 22 China has reaffirmed its
patron-client relationship with Pakistan and advanced port projects
across the Indian Ocean region with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh,
and Djibouti. Thus, Mandala theory reflects the current state of relations
within the traditional Indian sphere of influence and at the strategic level.

Attributes of Indian Statecraft
Viewed through the Mandala theory, two attributes of India’s statecraft
emerge as vectors for understanding its approach to national security—
strategic partnership and silent war. Strategic partnership agreements
(SPAs) are policy positions consistent with Kautilyan thought regarding
a preference for alignment over alliances.23 Kautilya’s concept of silent
war encourages nations to weaken and harass adversaries through means
below the threshold of overt hostilities. 24 India uses strategic partnerships
to exert influence through foreign policy with friendly states and uses silent
war, which emphasizes competition over conflict, to pursue its interests
vis-à-vis Pakistan and China.
Strategic Partnerships: Kautilyan Alignment
Strategic partnership agreements began as a Soviet approach to bilateral
relations during the Cold War. The Soviets pursued bilateral agreements
to establish patron-client relationships, avoid the constraints of multistate
19. Kautilya, Arthashastra, xiv, 506–7; and Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra,” 18.
20. Kautilya, Arthashastra, xiv, 507; and Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra,” 18.
21. Raju G. C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 16;
and Kautilya, Arthashastra, 521–22.
22. Thomas, Indian Security Policy, 16.
23. Kautilya, Arthashastra, 103, 511, 544, 566, 571, 576; and Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra,” 17, 21.
24. Kautilya, Arthashastra, 513, 533; and Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra,” 22, 23.
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alliances, and operate outside the construct of the international system. 25
India’s preference for these behaviors is evident in its historical policy
of nonalignment and is supported by Kautilyan thought on joint
undertakings, which describes the importance of cooperation with other states
for access to resources, trade routes, and military basing.26 India sees
strategic partnerships from a Kautilyan perspective: it avoids entangling
alliances while providing a means to pursue its national interests through
“access to markets, finance, technology, arms, intelligence, and other
commodities that it does not possess.”27 India has increased the use of SPAs,
signing at least 28 agreements since 1998 with countries as varied as the
United States, China, and Afghanistan.28 Raju G. C. Thomas identifies these
maneuvers as alignment strategies and argues they have served India as well
as or better than alliances that could compel India to act militarily.29
India’s agreements with Afghanistan demonstrate New Delhi’s preference
for alignment over alliance in its statecraft. India signed the original
Treaty of Friendship with Afghanistan in 1950, one year after the conclusion
of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 and three years after partition.
The agreement accorded each state the right to establish embassies and
conduct diplomatic activities, manage trade, emphasize cultural exchanges,
and assist each other in industrial and agricultural development. 30
The agreement displayed India’s Kautilyan grasp of influence and focused
on applying diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power.
Notably, the agreement lacked any mention of military cooperation: it was
a policy of alignment, not an alliance. The 1950 Treaty of Friendship was
interrupted by Afghanistan’s 1978 Saur Revolution and subsequent civil
war. In Kautilyan fashion, when the nonbinding agreement no longer suited
India’s interests, New Delhi abandoned it.
Over 60 years later, the two nations signed the Strategic Partnership
between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
in October 2011. 31 This agreement referenced the democratic nature
of the two states, a desire to see the entire region prosper, and a shared
adherence to international law and the United Nations (UN) Charter.
25. Ian Hall, “Multialignment and Indian Foreign Policy under Narendra Modi,” Round Table 105, no. 3
(2016): 277.
26. Kautilya, Arthashastra, 582–85.
27. Hall, “Multialignment,” 282.
28. Hall, “Multialignment,” 277–78.
29. Thomas, Indian Security Policy, 16–17.
30. “Media Center: Treaty of Friendship between the Government of India and the Royal Government
of Afghanistan,” Ministry of External Affairs/Government of India (website), January 4, 1950,
https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6584/Treaty+of+Friendship.
31. “Media Center: Text of Agreement on Strategic Partnership Between the Republic of India and the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” Ministry of External Affairs/Government of India (website), October 4, 2011,
https://mea.gov.in/bilateral–documents.htm?dtl/5383/.
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Diplomatically, it required Afghanistan to support India’s pursuit of a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The SPA also outlined a
robust agenda of social, cultural, academic, and intellectual exchanges to
bolster historical and cultural links between the two states.32 Trade and
economic cooperation focused on regional interaction with other countries,
envisioning Afghanistan “as a trade, transportation and energy hub
connecting Central and South Asia.” 33 Additionally, it allowed India
to “assist, as mutually determined, in the training, equipping and capacity
building programmes for Afghan National Security Forces.”34 In a foreign
policy shift, this SPA changed India’s long-held stance of noninvolvement
in the Afghan conflict.
The Indo-Afghan SPA embraced all three of India’s national security
interests: sustaining the international system, deterring Pakistan,
and containing Chinese expansion. The SPA expanded India’s regional
influence by connecting it to a democratizing Afghanistan and secured one
more vote in India’s pursuit of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC), a position India believes commensurate with its role in the
international system. Furthermore, it indicated India’s policy of alignment
is not limited to benign approaches, as demonstrated by the introduction
of lethal aid. India’s outreach to Afghanistan, coupled with its Chabahar Port
initiative in Iran, showed a determination to open Central Asian markets
to India’s economy and ensure its energy security, directly supporting India’s
national security objectives of deterring Pakistan and countering Chinese
expansionism by maintaining its regional hegemony. It also demonstrates
India’s conceptual alignment with Afghanistan and its posturing to thwart
its nuclear armed neighbors, Pakistan and China, by seeking first-mover
economic and security advantages.
Kautilyan Silent War
Kautilya was a classical realist, given his assertion that states must seek
or suffer conquest. 35 India sees itself in realist terms relative to Pakistan and
China while acknowledging the modern constraints placed on nation-state
behavior. Following the founding of the United Nations, state sovereignty
became closely guarded and wars of aggression became unlawful. 36
India’s ability to counter Pakistan and China is complicated by the
32. Ministry of External Affairs, “Text of Agreement.”
33. Ministry of External Affairs, “Text of Agreement.”
34. Ministry of External Affairs, “Text of Agreement.”
35. Boesche, First Great Political Realist, 78.
36. United Nations Charter, United Nations (website), n.d., accessed January 5, 2022, https://www.un.org/en
/about-us/un-charter; and 3314 (XXIX). Definition of Aggression, Resolutions Adopted on the Reports of the
Sixth Committee, United Nations (1974), 143, https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/3314(XXIX).
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stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons, which drive states to avoid conflict.
Although Kautilya did not have to consider the constraints of an international
system and nuclear weapons, the Artha-shastra provides applicable
guidance. Kautilya believed kings would face two types of rivals: weak ones
to be exterminated (conquered) and strong ones requiring a long-term
approach of steady harassment and weakening.37 Facing nuclear-armed
and belligerent neighbors, which India views as strong states, Kautilyan
thought steers India away from direct confrontation and toward a strategy
of harassment and weakening through the application of soft and nonmilitary
instruments of power.
Pakistan remains a nuclear-armed garrison state which oscillates in
and out of pseudo-democratic status and runs the gamut of state behavior
from supporting terrorism to nuclear brinksmanship. 38 Kautilyan success
in a modern context is the avoidance of large-scale conventional conflict
with Pakistan and the denial of Afghanistan as strategic depth to the
Pakistani military. India’s persistent diplomatic, economic, and cultural
support for the government of Afghanistan demonstrated a foreign policy
informed by Kautilyan logic, specifically the support of “the [vulnerable]
enemy-in-the-rear of a strong king.”39 India saw opportunity in Afghanistan
and became the fifth-largest direct donor of economic support, pledging
over $3 billion. 40 India also gradually increased support for the Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces.
The impact of Afghanistan’s deepening relationship with India on the
Pakistani psyche should not be underestimated, nor should India’s aggressive
response to Pakistani-sponsored terrorist attacks on Indian military targets
launched into Pakistan.41 Afghanistan’s refusal to accept Pakistani military
aid provided India an opportunity to support a Mandalan ally while
harassing a Mandalan foe. Within months of signing the SPA, India outlined
a program to train over 25,000 Afghan officers and soldiers. 42 By 2014,
37. Kautilya, Arthashastra, xiv, 514–15, 520, 530; and Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra,” 20–21.
38. Thomas Bruneau et al., “Civil-Military Relations in Muslim Countries. The Cases of Egypt, Pakistan,
and Turkey,” Journal of Defense Resources Management 4, no. 2 (2013): 5–36, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream
/handle/10945/37500/01_bruneau_mayfield_mccaskey_weece_matei.pdf.
39. Kautilya, Arthashastra, 523.
40. Alyssa Ayres, “How India Can Help in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations Asia Unbound
(blog), April 14, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/how–india–can–help–afghanistan; and “Media Center:
Q.NO.282. Indian Aid to Afghanistan,” Ministry of External Affairs/Government of India, February 25, 2015,
http://www.mea.gov.in/lok–sabha.htm?dtl/24811/qno282+indian+aid+to+afghanistan; and “Media Center:
Q.NO.506. Indian Investments in Afghanistan,” Ministry of External Affairs/Government of India,
February 4, 2022, https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/34803/question+no506+indian+investments+in
+afghanistan.
41. “Special Report: Hissing Cousins – Why India and Pakistan Hate Each Other,” Economist (website),
July 22, 2017, https://www.economist.com/special-report/2017/07/24/why-india-and-pakistan-hate-each-other.
42. Nitin Gokhale, “India Boosts Afghan Military Role,” Diplomat (website), December 7, 2017,
http://thediplomat.com/2011/12/india–boosts–afghan–military–role/.
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the program evolved beyond commissioning and initial-entry programs to
the training of Afghan commandos.43 Indian support expanded to nonlethal
aid with the delivery of three light utility helicopters in 2015. 44 A significant
shift in Indian policy came in 2016 with the delivery of four Mi-35 attack
helicopters to the Afghan Air Force, India’s first foray into lethal aid.45
India’s delivery of lethal aid, widely considered by Afghans a positive
development was quietly acknowledged by the US-led Resolute Support
Mission in Kabul. Both actions carry the hallmarks of Kautilya’s concept
of silent war, competing with adversaries indirectly through actions that
harass and weaken their position militarily.46
From an Indian perspective, a stable and Indian-friendly Afghanistan
would have required Pakistan to rethink its concept of strategic depth and
its continued indifference to, if not overt support for, violent-extremist
organizations within its borders. Despite the Taliban’s return to power
following the US withdrawal, the Afghan-Pakistani relationship remains
uncertain. Without an American-led military structure in Afghanistan
for violent-extremist organizations to oppose, Pakistan may be forced either
to address its policy of supporting these proxies or to allow itself to be
threatened by them. Either outcome suits India’s interests.
Opportunity in the Indo-Pacific
While Afghanistan provided India an opportunity to harass and
weaken Pakistan, China presents a larger and more capable problem.
Relative to China, India is at a military and economic disadvantage—
the “weak king,” in Kautilyan parlance—which limits its means to manage
Chinese encroachment. 47 Historically, India has firmly maintained its status
as a nonaligned state, partly to avoid provoking China militarily. This concept
is central to India’s foreign policy as New Delhi seeks to delay conflict
with China and build capability, congruent with Kautilyan thought
on a state’s fluctuating power over time. 48 India’s efforts to harass and weaken
Pakistan were land centric. Future strategic competition with China will take
43. Sanjeev Miglani, “India Begins Training Afghan Commandos as Ties Deepen Ahead of 2014,”
Reuters (website), December 20, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/india–afghanistan/india–begins
–training–afghan–commandos–as–ties–deepen–ahead–of–2014–idINDEE9BJ05E20131220.
44. “Media Statement by Prime Minister during the Visit of President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
to India (April 28, 2015),” Ministry of External Affairs/Government of India (website), April 28, 2015,
http://mea.gov.in/Speeches–Statements.htm?dtl/25136.
45. Franz-Stefan Gady, “India Delivers 4th Combat Helicopter to Afghanistan,” Diplomat (website),
December 1, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/india-delivers-4th-combat-helicopter-to-afghanistan/.
46. Kautilya, Arthashastra, 505, 513, 533, 630.
47. Burgess, “U.S. Pivot to Asia,” 369–70; and Kautilya, Arthashastra, 622–23.
48. Kautilya, Arthashastra, 507–9; and Burgess, “U.S. Pivot to Asia,” 372.
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place where India’s economic, energy, and national security must be ensured
and where the geography and international law enable competition: at sea.49
As India’s power grows, its idealistic approach of nonalignment has
yielded to expanding national security interests. Since independence,
India has modified its foreign policy, moving through periods of nonalignment,
strategic autonomy, “multi-alignment,” and now into an approach known as
“neo-Curzonian” foreign policy. 50 This new Indian policy represents increased
cooperation with Australia, Japan, and the United States. 51 India’s clear-eyed
emphasis on revitalizing its economy while deepening its regional security
ties reflects this new reality.52 Current US policy for the Indo-Pacific aligns
with Indian interests, a point made clear in Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s
December 2021 speech on a free and open Indo-Pacific and reinforced
in his May 2022 speech on the United States’ approach to the
People’s Republic of China. 53 The convergence of American and Indian
national security interests in containing Chinese encroachment and
complementary long-term regional policies creates the opportunity to secure
Indian partnership.

The Quad: Kautilyan Alignment and Silent War
Persuading India into a full security partnership with the United States
will not be easy, and may not be necessary. India’s use of bilateral SPAs
is consistent with Kautilyan foreign policy concepts and congruent with the
alignment of like-minded states. Therefore, it is unsurprising the Quad rests
at the center of India’s foreign policy under Modi.
Born in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the Quad rose
and foundered as it drifted toward a security-focused organization. 54
Revitalized in 2017, the Quad focused on a clear nonsecurity mandate:
diplomatic, information, and economic alignment. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar,
India’s minister for external affairs, hailed the Quad’s revitalization
as a major diplomatic accomplishment of Modi’s administration, adding,
49. Navy, Indian Maritime Security Strategy, 5.
50. Hall, “Multialignment,” 271, 273, 275, 282; and C. Raja Mohan, “The Return of the Raj,” American Interest
Online 5, no. 5 (2010), https://www.the-american–interest.com/2010/05/01/the–return–of–the–raj/.
51. Medcalf, “Indian National Security Strategy,” 517–18.
52. C. Raja Mohan and Parag Khanna, “Getting India Right: Mutual Interests and Democratic Affinity,”
Hoover Institution (website), February 1, 2006, https://www.hoover.org/research/getting–india–right.
53. Trump, National Security Strategy, 46; Antony J. Blinken, “Speech: A Free and Open Indo-Pacific,”
US Department of State (website), December 14, 2021, https://www.state.gov/a–free–and–open–indo
–pacific/; and Antony J. Blinken, “Speech: The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,”
US Department of State (website), May 26, 2022, https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to
-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.
54. Associated Press, “What’s the 4-Nation Quad, and Where Did It Come From?” Economic Times (website),
May 24, 2022, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/whats-the-4-nation-quad-and-where-did
-it-come-from/articleshow/91772674.cms.
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“it is also a statement of [India’s] growing interests beyond the Indian
Ocean.”55 Jaishankar describes India as “overcoming the hesitations
of history” and the Quad as developing relationships that align with India’s
national interests and vision “of shaping the region and the world.”56
The Quad leaders did not meet in person until September 2021.
When they reconvened in May 2022, they delivered a true development:
the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness.57
This partnership enables Quad members to share information and deliver
real-time maritime data to existing information-sharing centers in India,
Singapore, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. 58 Maritime Domain
Awareness, is a dual-use capability that allows nations to access shared data
to combat illegal fishing, piracy, and dark shipping. Additionally, it allows
the Quad to monitor the hallmarks of Chinese encroachment—incursions
into economic exclusion zones and the persistent violation of maritime
boundaries. The Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness
deftly addressed economic and sovereignty issues without naming China as
an adversary or labeling the Quad as a security organization.
The Quad and the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain
Awareness demonstrate the Kautilyan influence of alignment and silent
warfare on Indian foreign policy. The Indian Maritime Security Strategy
identifies Maritime Domain Awareness as a task that supports responding to
nontraditional threats at sea, ensuring freedom of navigation, upholding the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, deterring adversaries, and
managing conflict. 59 India’s strategy points directly to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, leveraging the international system and
courts that would subsequently rule in favor of the Philippines and against
Chinese claims in the South China Sea.60 India draws strength and authority
from the international system. India’s Maritime Security Strategy and
the contemporary foreign policy focus on the Quad demonstrate support

55. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, “Opinion: Quad Validates PM’s India-First Approach, Writes S Jaishankar”
Hindustan Times (website), May 25, 2022, https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/quad-validates-pm-s-india
-first-approach-101653498815738.html.
56. Jaishankar, “PM’s India-First Approach.”
57. “Media Center: Joint Statement from Quad Leaders”; “Briefing Room: Joint Statement from Quad Leaders”;
“Media Center: Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement”; and “Briefing Room: Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement.”
58. “Media Center: Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement”; “Briefing Room: Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement”;
and “Briefing Room FACT SHEET: Quad Leaders’ Tokyo Summit 2022,” May 23, 2022, https://www
.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/fact-sheet-quad-leaders-tokyo-summit-2022/.
59. Navy, Indian Maritime Security Strategy, 6–7, 50, 64.
60. In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration, Permanent Court of Arbitration, case no.
2013-19 (Permanent Court of Arbitration, Hague 2016), https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712
-Award.pdf.
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for Indian national interests of sustaining the international system and
maintaining regional hegemony.

Mandalan Motives
Approaching India requires deft regional realism and careful international
diplomacy. India’s desire for strategic autonomy, paired with its assessment
of the region and national security objectives, has resulted in some
alignments that give the United States pause. Specifically, US leadership
questions India’s economic alignment with Iran, its dependency on Russia
for defense-related articles, its participation in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa), and its problematic voting record in the UN.
The US-Iranian relationship impacts India’s ability to advance its national
security objectives, specifically the maintenance of the regional hegemony and
management of Chinese encroachment. The withdrawal of the United States
from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action resulted in the collapse
of Indian oil imports—Iran’s second largest market—and a boon for China,
which became the near-exclusive export destination for Iranian oil. 61
The collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action also highlighted
the Chinese-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement signed
in 2016, which called for Chinese-Iranian cooperation on issues ranging
from defense and security to energy, ports, and other infrastructure projects. 62
These outcomes did not advance American interests and jeopardized Indian
economic and national security interests while bolstering Chinese influence
and access in Iran.
Indian dependence on Russian defense articles is another point
of potential contention. From 2018 to 2021, India was the world’s
largest importer of defense items, and from 2012 to 2016, over 68 percent
of India’s defense imports came from Russia.63 The 2022 Russian invasion
of Ukraine has highlighted India’s dependency, which runs counter to India’s
pursuit of strategic autonomy. Similarly, India would see dependence on the
61. Nidhi Verma and Julia Payne, “Indian, European Refiners Get Ready to Buy Iranian Oil,” Reuters
(website), May 19, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indian-refiners-set-curb-spot-buying-make
-room-iranian-oil-2021-05-19/.
62. Hassan Rouhani, “Full Text of Joint Statement on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between I.R.
Iran, P.R. China,” January 23, 2016, https://www.president.ir/EN/91435; and Reuters Staff, “Iran and China
Sign 25-Year Cooperation Agreement,” Reuters (website), March 27, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us
-iran-china/iran-and-china-sign-25-year-cooperation-agreement-idUSKBN2BJ0AD.
63. “TIV of Arms Imports to the Top 50 Largest Importers, 2018-2021,” Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) (website), accessed July 10, 2022, https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/toplist
.php; and Kate Blanchfield, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezman, “The State of Major Arms Transfers
in 8 Graphics,” SIPRI WritePeace (blog), February 22, 2017, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2017
/state-major-arms-transfers-8-graphics.
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United States, whose weapons sales come with many more restrictions and
caveats, as equally disadvantageous.
India’s membership in BRICS, a grouping of five major emerging
economies, indicates some economic alignment with China and Russia.
More importantly, from an Indian perspective, membership bolsters India’s
international status, provides economic access to the global south, and
balances its increasing connectedness to the West—all three of which serve
to advance India’s desire for strategic autonomy.64 In the United Nations,
India abstained on 2022 votes condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine
and its removal from the Human Rights Commission.65 These abstentions
must be considered in the context of India’s desire to obtain a permanent
seat on the United Nations Security Council, a foreign policy objective only
achievable through a reformation of the UNSC, with China and Russia’s
consent. By not voting with the West on Ukraine, India avoided antagonizing
China and protected access to logistical support for its inventory of Russian
military equipment.

Conclusion
Kautilyan logic drives India to avoid alliances and seek alignment
with countries that can advance its interests. Through an understanding
of India’s perspective and Kautilya’s influence on Indian foreign policy
and strategy, the United States can take several actions to gain Indian
partnership and address US national security interests of managing
a rising China.
The United States must take a more deliberate approach to its diplomatic
relationship with India than with other Asian actors. A permanent seat
on the UNSC is high on India’s priority list, and the United States has
supported this objective. Revisiting this issue formally in the UN would
bolster India’s stature on the global stage. Importantly, it would send
a clear message to China and Pakistan regarding democratic values in the
furtherance of the international system. Additionally, it would provide
India equal footing with China on the UNSC, a position that could bolster
US efforts to steer China toward peaceful growth. Sustaining the rules-based

64. Michael Kugelman, “India Plays BRICS to Its Interests,” Foreign Policy (website), June 23, 2022,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/23/brics-summit-india-russia-china-quad/.
65. “UN News: Russia Blocks Security Council Action on Ukraine,” United Nations (website),
February 26, 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/02/1112802; and “UN News: UN General Assembly
Votes to Suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council,” United Nations (website), April 7, 2022,
https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782.
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international system is a clear area of Kautilyan alignment for India and the
United States and would further balance the influence of China and Russia.
The United States must resist the urge to militarize the Quad lest it lose
the Indo-Pacific’s most powerful diplomatic tool of the twenty-first century.
The Quad states’ diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments
of national power are aligned. Every deliverable the Quad produces
advances the sustainment of the international system and pushes back
on Chinese encroachment—two of India’s identified vital national interests
in complete alignment with those of the United States. The United States
must recognize that while India did not vote in support of the US position
in the United Nations, India’s abstentions were made to manage the timing
and conditions for what the Indians believe is the coming Sino-Indian
conflict. Finally, the United States should continue to encourage Indian
defense relationships with like-minded states and support Indian decisions
to move away from Russian equipment, even if these actions do not result
in American sales.
Policies of nonalignment and strategic independence saw India
through multiple conflicts with Pakistan and China, but today these
adversaries are effectively aligned nuclear powers, and their management
requires a different approach. 66 The operationalization of India’s foreign
policy through the Quad demonstrates India’s recognition of the
changing environment.67
The United States must break its reactive approach to South Asian
policy and proactively pursue opportunities in the region.68 Securing India’s
partnership is a logical next step for the United States in pursuing a free
and open Indo-Pacific. A strong and US-aligned India will bolster the
rules-based international order, encourage Pakistani compliance
with international norms, and steer China toward a path of peaceful
prosperity by changing the calculus of confrontation.

66. Thomas, Indian Security Policy, 21.
67. Gurmeet Kanwal, “Next Steps in the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership: Defense Cooperation Must Be
Taken to a Higher Trajectory,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (website), October 8, 2015, https://
www.csis.org/analysis/next-steps-us-india-strategic-partnership-defense-cooperation-must-be-taken-higher.
68. Burgess and Beilstein, “Multilateral Defense Cooperation,” 4.
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